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Actually Less Guilty:
The Extension of the Actual Innocence
Exception to the Sentencing Phase of
Non-Capital Cases
BY MATTHEW MATTINGLY*
I. INTRODUCTION
( urrently a three-way circuit split exists as to whether or not the
actual innocence exception' to procedurally defaulted,
successive or abusive habeas corpus claims applies to the sentencing
phase of non-capital cases. The Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have
held that this exception does not apply to this phase.2 The Fourth and
Fifth Circuits have held that the actual innocence exception does apply,
but only in the context of defendants sentenced under habitual offender
statutes. 3 The Second Circuit alone has held that the actual innocence
exception applies to the sentencing phase of all non-capital cases.
4
On October 14, 2003, the Supreme Court of the United States
granted certiorari in Dretke v. Haley.5 This gave the Court an opportunity
to finally resolve the current split among the federal circuit courts
regarding the extension of the actual innocence exception to the
sentencing phase of non-capital cases. Instead, in its May 3, 2004
decision, the Supreme Court held that other grounds should have been
addressed by the federal habeas court prior to the actual innocence
exception issue. Accordingly, the Court remanded the case to the Fifth
* J.D. 2005, University of Kentucky College of Law.
The actual innocence exception is an exception through which procedurally
defaulted, successive, or abusive habeas corpus claims, which otherwise would be barred,
are allowed provided the petitioner is shown to be actually innocent of the crime charged
or, in some circumstances, undeserving of the sentence imposed.
2 See Hope v. United States, 108 F.3d 119 (7th Cir. 1997); Embrey v. Hershberger,
131 F.3d 739 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Richards, 5 F.3d 1369 (10th Cir. 1993).
3 See Haley v. Cockrell, 306 F.3d 257 (5th Cir. 2002), vacated sub nora. Dretke v.
Haley, 124 S. Ct. 1847 (2004); United States v. Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d 490 (4th Cir.
1999).
4 See Spence v. Superintendent, Great Meadow Corr. Facility, 219 F.3d 162 (2d
Cir. 2000).
5 Dretke v. Haley, 540 U.S. 945 (2003).
531
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Circuit Court of Appeals for decision on these alternative grounds. 6 In so
doing, the Court sidestepped a perfect opportunity to finally shed some
light on an issue that has divided the federal circuit courts for over a
decade.
In Haley, Michael Wayne Haley was arrested after stealing a
calculator from a Texas Wal-Mart in 1997. 7 Due to his two prior theft
convictions, Haley was charged with a "state jail felony" punishable by
up to two years in prison.8 Additionally, Haley was charged under the
Texas habitual offender statute.9 His habitual offender status was
predicated on two prior felony convictions for delivery of amphetamines
and attempted robbery, respectively.' 0 It was later determined that the
first conviction did not become final prior to the commission of the
second, rendering Haley ineligible for the enhanced sentence he had
received. "
At the trial level, when the state offered evidence of his prior
convictions, Haley did not cross-examine the State's witness, offer
evidence, or enter a plea regarding the sentence enhancements." Haley's
ineligibility for his enhanced sentence was brought up for the first time in
a state habeas corpus claim. 3 The state habeas court refused to consider
this claim, as it had not previously been preserved either at trial or on
direct appeal, as required by state law, 14 and on this ground contended
that Haley was ineligible for federal habeas corpus relief.'5 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that, in spite of this
default, Haley fell within the actual innocence exception to defaulted
habeas corpus claims.' 6 As a result, the court officially extended the
6 Dretke v. Haley, 124 S. Ct. 1847, 1852 (2004) (holding that the petitioner had a
viable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and that this claim should have been
addressed prior to making an extension of the actual innocence exception to the
sentencing phase of a non-capital case).
7 Id. at 1849.
8 Id. at 1850. Haley had been charged with theft, a Class A misdemeanor, but two
prior theft convictions elevated this to a "state jail felony." Haley, 306 F.3d at 259.
9 Dretke, 124 S. Ct. at 1850.
10 Id.
II Id. "Under Texas' habitual offender statute, only a defendant convicted of a
felony who 'has previously been finally convicted of two felonies, and the second
previous felony conviction is for an offense that occurred subsequent to the first previous
conviction having become final, . . . shall be punished for a second degree felony."' Id.
The record, however, indicated that Haley's second previous felony was committed on
October 15, 1991, three days before his first conviction became final. Id.
'2 1d.
13 id.
14 id.
5 1d. at 1851.
16 Haley v. Cockrell, 306 F.3d 257, 264 (5th Cir. 2002), vacated sub nom. Dretke v.
Haley, 124 S. Ct. 1847 (2004).
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actual innocence exception to the sentencing phase of non-capital cases
in the Fifth Circuit.'
7
This note offers an evaluation of the extension of the actual
innocence exception to the sentencing phase of non-capital cases in the
wake of the Supreme Court's avoidance of the issue in Dretke. Part II
begins by explaining the writ of habeas corpus, the emergence of the
actual innocence exception, and its role in habeas corpus jurisprudence.
Then, in Part III, the three sides of the federal circuit split will be
examined. Part IV proposes that the actual innocence exception should
be extended to the sentencing phase of all non-capital cases, provided
that the petitioner's actual innocence renders him ineligible for the
sentence received.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Writ of Habeas Corpus
The writ of habeas corpus is a procedure through which a previously
convicted petitioner is brought before a court, typically to ensure the
legality of his imprisonment.'8 Habeas review is a fundamental part of
the American legal system and is protected by the Constitution.' 9 Initially
provided for by common law, the writ of habeas corpus was first codified
in the Judiciary Act of 1789, which made the writ available to federal
20 21prisoners. In 1867, Congress extended the writ to state prisoners.
Given its protection of the very notions of justice which underlie the
American judicial system, the importance of the writ of habeas corpus
cannot be overstated.
Nonetheless, the writ is subject to abuse and can be problematic for a
number of reasons. After-the-fact review of cases may undermine the
finality of judgments, thus hindering one of the primary purposes of the
American legal system. 22 Habeas review also makes use of "scarce
federal judicial resources and threatens the capacity of the system to
resolve primary disputes. 23 Additionally, the possibility of federal
habeas corpus review might motivate parties to withhold certain
evidence at the initial trial so it would be available to serve as the basis
171id
18 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 715 (7th ed. 1999).
19 See U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, ci. 2 ("The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety
may require it.").
20 McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 477 (1991).
21 Id. at 478.
22ld. at 491.
23 Id.
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for a later habeas claim.24 Additional problems arise when federal habeas
review involves a state prisoner. Such review can be problematic both to
state sovereignty and to the willingness of states to cooperate with
federal courts in the protection of constitutional rights.2 1 In light of these
potential problems, the availability of the writ of habeas corpus must be
limited.
The need for limits on the scope of the writ of habeas corpus is
complicated by the fact that, at common law, res judicata was not
applicable to a denial of habeas review.26 Rather, a petitioner's habeas
claim could be given to different judges and courts, none of whom were
expected to be uninfluenced by earlier denials. 27 Needless to say, such
treatment would not be practical today given the size of the modem
American legal system. As a result, both Congress and the courts began
to impose limitations on the scope of habeas review.28
Given the equitable nature of habeas courts, these limitations should
strike a balance between protecting the integrity of the system and
ensuring that justice is served.29 In pursuit of this goal, in Wainwright v.
Sykes30 the Supreme Court adopted the cause and prejudice test for
defaulted habeas corpus claims.3' Under this standard, such claims may
be entertained by a federal court only where it is shown that: 1) there is
cause for the default and 2) not entertaining the claim would result in
32
prejudice to the petitioner. In adopting this standard, the court rejected
a more lenient view which had previously been set forth.33 The Court
reasoned that, while strict enough to protect against abuse, the cause and
prejudice standard would not "prevent a federal habeas court from
adjudicating for the first time the federal constitutional claim of a
defendant who in the absence of such an adjudication will be the victim
of a miscarriage of justice. 3 4 Thus, the Court created a rule which
sought both to protect the integrity of the system and to ensure justice.
24 id.
25 Id.
26 Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 317 (1995).
27 Id.
2 8
1 d. at 318-19.
29 Id. at 319.
30 Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
31 Id. Later the cause and prejudice test was extended to abusive and successive
habeas corpus claims. See Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 338 (1992) ("Unless a
habeas petitioner shows cause and prejudice, a court may not reach the merits of: (a)
successive claims that raise grounds identical to the grounds heard and decided on the
merits in a previous petition; (b) new claims, not previously raised, which constitute an
abuse of discretion ....").
32 See Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 72.
33 See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 399 (1963) (requiring a knowing waiver in order
for claims to be barred).
24 Wainwright, 433 U.S. at 91.
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B. The Actual Innocence Exception
In Murray v. Carrier,35 the Supreme Court set forth the actual
innocence exception 36 to the cause and prejudice test as an additional
safeguard37 with respect to procedurally defaulted habeas claims. The
Murray Court found that in very limited instances, even where a
petitioner does not show cause for their default, a federal habeas court
may hear the claim.38 The Court explained: "we think that in an
extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has resulted in the
conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal habeas court may
grant the writ even in the absence of a showing of cause for the
procedural default."39 In this way, the actual innocence exception was
created as a safeguard against injustice. The Court reasoned, "[W]e
remain confident that, for the most part 'victims of a fundamental
miscarriage of justice will meet the cause and prejudice standard.' But
we do not pretend that this will always be true."40 The actual innocence
exception serves to provide relief in those limited circumstances where
the cause and prejudice test would result in an injustice.
In Kuhlmann v. Wilson,41 decided the same day as Murray, the Court
sought to define when, given this new exception, courts may entertain
successive habeas corpus claims in order to protect the "ends of
justice. ' 2 The Court made clear the importance of the actual innocence
exception but found that its use should be rare,43 ruling that such claims
should be entertained only where "the prisoner supplements his
constitutional claim with a colorable showing of factual innocence, ' 44 a
standard which would later be modified.4 5 Thus, the actual innocence
exception was given very limited applicability.
In Herrera v. Collins46 the Supreme Court held that the actual
innocence exception is only applicable where there is some constitutional
violation.47 The Court explained that "actual innocence is not itself a
35 Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 488 (1986).
36 It should be noted that the actual innocence exception is sometimes referred to as
the prevention of a miscarriage ofjustice.
17 Murray, 433 U.S. at 495.
3 Id. at 488.
3 Id. at 496.
40 Id. at 495.
41 Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986).
41 Id. at 454.
43 Id.
44Id.
45 See Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992). But see Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S.
298 (1995).
46 Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
41 Id. at 404.
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constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a habeas
petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim
considered on the merits. ' 48 In this case the Supreme Court has made it
clear that actual innocence is not a cure-all for unjust sentences and
convictions, but rather a means of making the writ of habeas corpus a
more effective safeguard. In so doing, the Court further narrowed the
applicability of an already limited source of relief.
C. The Extension ofActual Innocence to the Sentencing Phase of
Capital Cases
On the same day Kuhmann and Murray were decided, the Supreme
Court acknowledged in Smith v. Murray 9 "that the concept of 'actual,'
as distinct from 'legal,' innocence does not translate easily into the
context of an alleged error at the sentencing phase of a trial on a capital
offense." 50 This was based on the troubling concept of being innocent of
death; that is, that the petitioner was not actually innocent of the crime,
but rather was not culpable enough to warrant the death sentence
received. In such a context, "actually innocent" would really mean
"actually less guilty." It is understandable how this notion could be
problematic given the limited scope of the actual innocence exception.
Nonetheless, six years later the Supreme Court made just such an
extension in Sawyer v. Whitley-1 There the Court described the
application of the actual innocence exception in non-capital cases as
"easy to grasp.,52 With regard to the sentencing phase of capital cases,
however, the Court said, "'innocent of death' is not a natural usage of
those words, but we must strive to construct an analog to the simpler
situation of a non-capital defendant. 5 3 In so doing, the Court chose
between three possible ways of defining actual innocence in the context
of capital sentences.54
The three proposed options involved looking at either: 1) the
elements of the crime; 2) the elements of the crime and aggravating
factors; or 3) the elements of the crime and both aggravating and
mitigating factors.5" The Court found that merely allowing evidence
48 id.
49 Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986).
50 Id. at 537.
51 Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992).
52 Id. at 340. As will be discussed later, the application in non-capital case is
anything but "easy to grasp," and this ambiguous language has been used to support both
sides of the argument.
13 Id. at 341.
14 Id. at 343.
55
Id.
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regarding actual innocence of the elements of the crime was too
restrictive. 56 Such an approach would not serve to extend the exception
to the sentencing phase, an extension the Court felt was warranted.57 In
the end, the Court found that the best means of defining actual innocence
with regard to the sentencing phase of capital cases was to allow proof of
actual innocence of aggravating factors-those making the petitioner
eligible for the death penalty-but not mitigating factors.58
The Court refused to allow actual innocence of mitigating factors for
two reasons. First, such an allowance would mean that the required
showing for application of the actual innocence exception would
essentially be the same as what was already required to show prejudice
under the cause and prejudice test.59 Therefore, allowing such a broad
extension would lead to the erosion of the cause prong of the cause and
prejudice test.60 Such an extension would replace cause and prejudice
with actual innocence as the general standard for allowing defaulted,
successive, and abusive habeas corpus claims. More importantly,
according to the Court, actual innocence is meant to be a narrow
exception to the requirement that the petitioner must show both cause
and prejudice in order to have their habeas corpus claims heard.6'
Allowing the consideration of mitigating factors in that context would
"so broaden the inquiry as to make it anything but a 'narrow'
exception. 6 2 Allowing consideration of the elements of the crime and
aggravating factors, however, would focus attention on the elements that
make the petitioner eligible for the death penalty.63 The Supreme Court
thus extended the actual innocence exception to the sentencing phase of
capital cases, allowing consideration of the actual innocence of a
petitioner regarding the elements of the crime and aggravating factors. 64
While clarifying the role of actual innocence in the sentencing phase
of capital cases, Sawyer at the same time further blurred the already
puzzling question of whether such an extension also applies to non-
capital sentences. The ambiguous and confusing manner in which the
Court discussed actual innocence in non-capital cases in Sawyer-while
also suggesting that actual innocence in such cases is "easy to grasp ' 65 -
set the stage for over a decade of uncertainty as to whether or not the
56 id.
57id.
" Id. at 347.
59 Id. at 345.
60 id.
61 id .
62 Id.
63 Id. at 347.
64id.
6 5 Id. at 341.
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exception also applied to the sentencing phase of non-capital cases. This
debate came to a head on October 14, 2003, when certiorari was granted
in Dretke v. Haley.66 The Supreme Court's decision in that case could
have resolved the current three-way circuit split regarding the
applicability of the actual innocence exception in the sentencing phase of
non-capital cases. Instead, the Court chose to sidestep the issue, allowing
uncertainty to prevail regarding the applicability of the exception in this
context.
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Currently, the federal circuit courts are split three ways regarding the
applicability of the actual innocence exception to the sentencing phase of
non-capital cases. The Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have held
that the exception does not apply to non-capital sentences.67 The Fourth
and Fifth Circuits have held that the actual innocence exception does
apply in such cases, but only regarding those sentenced under habitual
offender statutes.68 The Second Circuit alone has held that the exception
applies to the sentencing phase of all non-capital cases.69
A. The Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits
In United States v. Richards,7 ° the Tenth Circuit held that "one
cannot be actually innocent of a non-capital sentence. ' 71 Defendant
Larry Richards, in a second habeas corpus petition, raised the issue (not
raised in the first petition) that his sentence, calculated according to the
amount of methamphetamine in his possession, included in that amount
the weight of wastewater.72 The government successfully pled that this
was abuse of the writ, and that the only ways Richards' claim could be
heard were either upon a showing of cause and prejudice or upon a
showing of actual innocence.73 The court, citing Sawyer, said that to be
actually innocent in the non-capital context meant that you did not
66 Dretke v. Haley, 540 U.S. 945 (2003).
67 See infra Section III.A.
68 See infra Section III.B.
69 See infra Section III.C.
7o United States v. Richards, 5 F.3d 1369 (10th Cir. 1993).
" ld. at 1371.
72 Id. at 1370. Petitioner contended that the inclusion of the wastewater (a
byproduct of methamphetamine production) is a misapplication of the federal sentencing
guidelines. The district court agreed and thus reduced Richards' sentence from 188
months to 60 months. Id.
73 id.
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commit the crime.74 Thus the abusive habeas claim did not fall within the
actual innocence exception and could not be entertained, as Richards did
not claim to be innocent of the crime itself, but rather that he was
improperly sentenced. In subsequent cases, the Tenth Circuit has
continued to hold steadfastly to its ruling in Richards that one cannot be
actually innocent of a non-capital sentence 5
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit has barred the extension of the actual
innocence exception to the sentencing phase of non-capital cases.76 In
Embrey v. Hershberger,7 the Eighth Circuit had before it the case of a
man who had been sentenced to consecutive twenty-year sentences
under the Federal Bank Robbery Act and the Federal Kidnapping Act,
respectively.78 Embrey argued that, according to the intent of Congress in
the Federal Bank Robbery Act, his conviction under the Federal
Kidnapping Act was illegal, as the Federal Bank Robbery Act was
supposed to operate to the exclusion of all other applicable federal
statutes. 79 However, having brought up the same issue on "at least three
or four other occasions," Embrey's petition for habeas review was
successive.80 This presented the question of whether the actual innocence
exception was available in the context of a non--capital sentence.
The Embrey court held that it was not. The court supported this
holding by pointing to the language in Sawyer stating that actual
innocence in non-capital cases is "easy to grasp."'8 The court also felt
that allowing such a claim would threaten the limited nature of the actual
innocence exception.82 The court said, referring to the language in
Sawyer, "[w]e believe with the Tenth Circuit, that the most natural
inference to draw from these observations on the Court's part is that in
non-capital cases the concept of actual innocence is 'easy to grasp'
because 'it simply means the person didn't commit the crime."' 83 Thus,
both the Tenth and Eighth Circuits have interpreted the Sawyer Court as
74 Id. at 1371. The court interpreted the statement in Sawyer that a "noncapital case
is easy to grasp" as meaning it was easy to grasp because it means the person did not
commit the crime. See id.
75 See Reid v. Oklahoma, 101 F.3d 628 (10th Cir. 1996).76 See Embrey v. Hershberger, 131 F.3d 73 9 (8th Cir. 1997).
77 Id. Here the petitioner raised the previously unraised claim that he was not
eligible for the sentence he received. In fact the U.S. Attorney, at oral argument, said that
Embrey should not be barred from raising his claim. The court did not agree. Id. at 746.
7SId. at 739.
79 Id. at 739-40.
g0 Id. at 740. A successive habeas corpus claim like this could only be heard
through: a) cause and prejudice or b) the actual innocence exception.
SlId.
82 Id. at 741.
83 Id. at 740-41.
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having foreclosed the availability of actual innocence in non-capital
sentences-an interpretation that is, at the very least, unclear.
Initially, the Seventh Circuit extended actual innocence to the
sentencing phase of non-capital cases. 84 However, in Hope v. United
States,8' the Seventh Circuit held that this extension of the actual
innocence exception did not survive the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996.86 Thus, the Seventh Circuit joined the Tenth
and Eighth Circuits in holding that one can not be actually innocent of a
non--capital sentence.
B. The Fourth and Fifth Circuits
Prior to Haley v. Cockrell,87 the Fifth Circuit had twice assumed,
without actually deciding, that the actual innocence exception applied to
the sentencing phase of non-capital cases involving habitual offenders.88
In Cockrell, the Fifth Circuit definitively held that the exception applied
in non-capital cases.89 In so doing, the court interpreted Sawyer as not
foreclosing the extension of actual innocence to the sentencing phase of
non-capital cases.90 Additionally, the court quoted the Supreme Court's
later explanation that the purpose of the rule "is grounded in the
'equitable discretion' of habeas courts to see that federal constitutional
errors do not result in the incarceration of innocent persons."
91
Essentially, the Cockrell court looked through the procedural problems
and arrived at the real issue, protecting petitioners from both wrongful
conviction and wrongful punishment. With its ruling in Cockrell, the
Fifth Circuit joined the Fourth Circuit in the contention that actual
innocence should apply to the sentencing phase of non-capital cases, but
84 See Mills v. Jordan, 979 F.2d 1273 (7th Cir. 1992). The court said: "[a]lthough
the issue is not well settled, we conclude that the actual innocence exception applies to
habitual offender proceedings such as Indiana's whether or not they involve the
possibility of capital punishment." Id. at 1279.
8' Hope v. United States, 108 F.3d 119 (7th Cir. 1997).
6 Id. at 120.
87 Haley v. Cockrell, 306 F.3d 257 (5th Cir. 2002), vacated sub noma. Dretke v.
Haley, 124 S. Ct. 1847 (2004).
88 See id. at 264 (citing Sones v. Hargett, 61 F.3d 410, 413 (5th Cir. 1995); Smith v.
Collins, 977 F.2d 951, 959 (5th Cir. 1992)). In both of these cases the court's dicta
assumes that the actual innocence exception applies to the sentencing phase of non-
capital cases; however, neither court explicitly made this holding.
89 Id. at 264. Although this holding was vacated and remanded by the Supreme
Court, it seems likely that if the Fifth Circuit were presented with this issue again they
would make the extension.
90 Id. at 265.
9' Id. (quoting Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993)).
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only with regard to habitual offender statutes.92 Although the Cockrell
holding was later vacated by the Supreme Court on alternative grounds,
93
it seems likely that, given a similar situation, the Fifth Circuit would
stand by its original decision to extend the actual innocence exception to
the sentencing phase of non-capital cases.
In United States v. Mikalajunas94 the Fourth Circuit narrowed an
earlier extension of actual innocence to all non-capital sentences. 95 The
court reasoned that an extension of actual innocence beyond those
sentenced under habitual offender statutes would "conflict squarely with
Supreme Court authority indicating that generally more than prejudice
must exist to excuse a procedural default. 96 This logic echoes other
courts' fears that a more broad extension of actual innocence might erode
the cause prong of the cause and prejudice test, and therefore take the
"rare" 97 actual innocence exception and make it the new rule of law. In
Cockrell, the Fifth Circuit followed this same line of reasoning in
reaching its conclusion that actual innocence in non-capital sentences
should be limited to those sentenced under habitual offender statutes.
98
C. The Second Circuit
In Spence v. Superintendent, Great Meadow Correctional Facility,
9 9
the Second Circuit extended the actual innocence exception to the
sentencing phase of all non--capital cases.100 Donovan Spence, who was
arrested on a robbery charge, was offered a deal by the judge: 0 1 if he
was not arrested again the judge would punish him only as a youthful
offender, but if he was arrested he would be given a sentence of eight-
and-one-third years to twenty-five years. 10 2 Soon after his release
92 See United States v. Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d 490, 495 (4th Cir. 1999).
93 Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 1852 (2004) ("A federal court faced with allegations
of actual innocence, whether of the sentence or of the crime charged, must first address
all non-defaulted claims for comparable relief and other grounds for cause to excuse the
procedural default.").
94 Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d at 490.
95 See United States v. Maybeck, 23 F.3d 888, 893 (4th Cir. 1994). The Fourth
Circuit dealt with a habitual offender statute, but the language of the case did not limit the
extension of actual innocence to such a situation. See id.
96 Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d at 495.
97 See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
98 Haley v. Cockrell, 306 F.3d 257, 266 (5th Cir. 2002), vacated sub nom. Dretke v.
Haley, 124 S. Ct. 1847 (2004). The court, after quoting the rationale of Mikalajunas said:
"We find the approach of the Fourth Circuit persuasive." Id.
99 Spence v. Superintendent, Great Meadow Corr. Facility, 219 F.3d 162 (2d Cir.
2000).
'° Id. at 171.
1o0 Id. at 165.
102 id.
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Spence was rearrested, again on robbery charges.' 03 Following through
on his promise, the judge imposed a stiff sentence relating to the first
robbery. 0°4 Later, however, it was determined that Spence did not
commit the second robbery and therefore did not deserve the judge's
harsher sentence. 05 The Second Circuit allowed the sentence to be
reduced, thereby extending the, actual innocence exception to the
sentencing phase of non-capital cases. The court explained that "[b]y
challenging the determination of his responsibility for the act predicating
his enhanced sentence, Spence raises precisely the question that the
actual innocence exception contemplates.' ' 6
The court reasoned that the Supreme Court has "made clear that the
availability of actual innocence exception depends not on the 'nature of
the penalty' the state imposes, but on whether the constitutional error
'undermined the accuracy of the guilt or sentencing determination."0 7
Clearly, this court did not interpret the prior Supreme Court habeas
corpus jurisprudence, particularly Sawyer, as foreclosing the
applicability of actual innocence to non-capital sentences. Thus, the
court saw little reason to differentiate between capital and non-capital
sentencing. 18
D. Understanding the Circuit Split
It seems that the vague language in Sawyer, stating that actual
innocence in non-capital cases is "easy to grasp,"' 09 is largely
responsible for the current dissension among the federal circuit courts
regarding whether or not the exception is applicable to the sentencing
phase of non-capital cases. The circuit split is particularly difficult to
reconcile due to the fact that this language has been interpreted
differently: it is used as support both by those courts in favor of
applicability and those opposed to it."l0 As a result, Sawyer has done
103 Id.
105 Id.
'o' Id. at 171.
1o7 Id. at 170-71 (quoting Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 538-39 (1986)).
108 Id. at 171. The court said: "Because the harshness of the sentence does not affect
the habeas analysis and the ultimate issue, the justice of the incarceration, is the same
there is no reason why the actual innocence exception should not apply to noncapital
sentences." Id.
109 Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 341 (1992).
10 See Haley v. Cockrell, 306 F.3d 257, 265 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding one can be
actually innocent of a non-capital sentence involving a habitual offender statute), vacated
sub nom. Dretke v. Haley 124 S. Ct. 1847 (2004); Embrey v. Hershberger, 131 F.3d 739,
740-41 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding one cannot be actually innocent of a non-capital
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nothing to bolster the understanding of actual innocence in the
sentencing phase of non-capital cases. With the granting of certiorari in
Dretke, 1 " these problems of interpretation could have at last been put to
rest. The issue should finally have moved from what the Supreme Court
meant by "easy to grasp" in Sawyer to the real policy concerns
surrounding the extension of the actual innocence exception to the
sentencing phase of non-capital cases. Instead, the Supreme Court
avoided the issue,1 12 refusing to put an end to the confusion and
disagreement which has characterized this issue for more than a decade.
IV. ANALYZING THE EXTENSION OF THE EXCEPTION
A. The Argument Against Extension
Clearly, the current circuit split regarding the extension of the actual
innocence exception to the sentencing phase of non-capital cases would
not exist were there not valid arguments on both sides. The arguments
against making this extension of the exception can be grouped into two
categories: 1) those relating to the generally problematic nature of the
writ of habeas corpus, and 2) those dealing specifically with the actual
innocence exception. Valid arguments can be found in each category.
As discussed earlier, the writ of habeas corpus can be problematic
for a number of reasons. Any expansion on the availability of the writ
must be balanced against these potential problems, and the actual
innocence exception is no different. It is imperative that we not allow our
federal courts to become bogged down by frivolous claims from inmates
who have nothing better to do than make unwarranted claims that their
imprisonment is unjust. Thus, the preservation of scarce judicial
resources is one factor limiting the availability of habeas review.
113
Additionally, by allowing collateral review the writ of habeas corpus
compromises the finality of judgments.'"4 Another concern with habeas
review is the fact that it can put a strain on the relationship between state
and federal courts. 15 These valid concerns attach generally to the writ of
habeas corpus and must be weighed whenever considering its
application.
sentence); United States v. Richards, 5 F.3d 1369, 1371 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding one
cannot be actually innocent of a non-capital sentence).
111 Dretke v. Haley, 540 U.S. 945 (2003).
112 See supra note 93.
113 See supra note 23.
114 See supra note 22.
115 See supra note 25.
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There are also arguments specifically addressed to the extension of
the actual innocence exception to the sentencing phase of non-capital
cases. The most common of these, to date, is that such an extension was
foreclosed by the Supreme Court in Sawyer.'1 6 However, with the
granting of certiorari in Dretke the Supreme Court had the opportunity to
decide this issue without concern for the subtle, entirely unclear,
implications of the Sawyer Court. Additionally, those circuit courts
which have already made this extension, either under limited
circumstances or fully as in the case of the Second Circuit, obviously did
not believe such action to be foreclosed by Sawyer.
Another concern with allowing actual innocence of non-capital
sentences is that this would erode the cause prong of the cause and
prejudice test. 117 Critics of extending the actual innocence exception also
point out the narrow scope of the exception and argue that any extension
would serve to undermine this limited scope.'1
B. The Importance of Extending the Actual Innocence Exception
There is no denying the validity of the arguments against extending
the actual innocence exception to the sentencing phase of non-capital
cases. In light of these legitimate concerns, it is easy to lose sight of what
is really at stake here-at the least someone's liberty, at the most
someone's life. Justice Black once said, "it is never too late for courts in
habeas corpus proceedings to look straight through procedural screens in
order to prevent forfeiture of life or liberty in flagrant defiance of the
Constitution."' 9 The actual innocence exception does just that. It is a
rare exception which serves to cut through all the red tape in order to
prevent a grave injustice. Viewed in this light, the arguments against the
extension are less than convincing.
It is true that the problematic nature of the writ of habeas corpus
carries over to the actual innocence exception. This, however, is not a
valid deterrent to extension. Any use of the writ must face these concerns
116 See Embrey v. Hershberger, 131 F.3d 739, 740 (8th Cir. 1997) ("[W]e think that
Sawyer, in terms, applies only to the sentencing phase of death cases."); United States v.
Richards, 5 F.3d 1369, 1371 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that a person cannot be actually
innocent of a non-capital sentence).
117 See Haley v. Cockrell, 306 F.3d 257, 265 (5th Cir. 2002), vacated sub nom.
Dretke v. Haley, 124 S. Ct. 1847 (2004); United States v. Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d 490,
494-95 (4th Cir. 1999). This contention is made also in defense of limiting applicability
to those non-capital offenders whose sentences were received under habitual offender
statutes.
118 See Embrey, 131 F.3d at 739; Richards, 5 F.3d at 1369.
119 Brown v. Allan, 344 U.S. 443, 554 (1954) (Black, J., dissenting). Note that
Justice Black says the forfeiture "of life or liberty." (emphasis added).
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and be balanced against the cost of undiscovered injustice. Perhaps it
could be argued that the finality of judgments and preservation of
resources are legitimate reasons not to create a new exception in habeas
corpus jurisprudence. A new exception, however, is not what is being
offered here; rather, it is the logical extension of an existing exception. If
these factors did not bar the creation of the actual innocence exception in
the first place, there is no reason to believe they will or should be
sufficient to block its extension to the sentencing phase of non-capital
cases. Justice Stevens put this in perspective in his Sawyer dissent:
Although we have frequently recognized the State's interest in finality
we have never suggested that that interest is sufficient to outweigh the
individual's claim to innocence. To the contrary, the 'actual innocence'
exception itself manifests our recognition that the criminal justice
system occasionally errs and that, when it does, finality must yield to
justice. 2 '
It is important to remember that the actual innocence exception is a tool
to be used in rare cases. 21 Additionally, its extension to the sentencing
phase of non-capital cases is a very small extension. This extension
would by no means serve to open up the floodgates to habeas courts.
This being the case, it is hard to imagine that such an extension will
result in a significant impact on the problems and concerns generally
associated with the writ of habeas corpus.
While it can be argued that the extension of this exception lacks
significance when balanced against the concerns of extending habeas
review, the same cannot be said for the significance of the extension
from the perspective of the petitioner using the exception to make a
defaulted, successive, or abusive habeas claim. Take for example the
situation in Embrey v. Hershberger,122 where a procedural default robbed
a man of twenty years of his life. 123 This is particularly egregious in light
of the fact that the U.S. Attorney in the case said at oral argument that
Embrey should not have been barred from making the claim.124 In this
sort of situation, an extension of the actual innocence exception to the
120 Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 364 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring).
121 Kuhlman v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454 (1986).
122 Embrey v. Hershberger, 131 F.3d 739 (8th Cir. 1997).
123 The dissent said: "Surely no one can claim that requiring an individual to serve a
twenty year illegal sentence is not a miscarriage of justice." Id. at 745 (Lay, J.,
dissenting).
124 Id. at 746 (Lay, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that while a court is not
required to accept such a concession, "where a claim of an illegal sentence is at issue, the
court should examine with great scrutiny the reasons it has rejected the government's
good faith concession." Id.
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sentencing phase of non-capital cases would serve to remedy a great
injustice,
It is difficult to understand why a showing of actual innocence
should be allowed for those petitioners convicted of capital crimes, but
not for those serving non-capital sentences. Other than the inherent
finality of capital punishment, little reason exists to differentiate between
capital and non-capital sentencing in terms of actual innocence. In fact,
the difference in finality is fairly insignificant, as by the time a petitioner
is trying to have their federal habeas corpus claim heard it is highly
unlikely that any further options exist for them. Is it any less outrageous
to force a petitioner to serve a significantly longer sentence than they
deserve than it is to execute them for a crime for which they should have
received only life in prison? While the public perception might be
different, in actuality the injustice seems to be the same. Essentially,
there is no difference between requiring a petitioner to serve a sentence
for which they were not eligible and putting an innocent man behind
bars. Framed in this light the choice is clear: the actual innocence
exception should be extended to the sentencing phase of non-capital
cases.
C. Eligibility
If it is accepted that an extension of the actual innocence exception
to non-capital sentences is warranted, the issue becomes when to allow
such an extension. Currently, courts seem to employ one of two options:
either a blanket extension 25 or extension only in those situations
involving a habitual offender statute. 126 It is asserted here that a hybrid of
these two options should be employed. Actual innocence should be
extended to those non-capital sentences where the petitioner's actual
innocence renders him ineligible for the sentence he received. It is likely
that in many, if not most, cases where this standard is met, habitual
offender statutes will be involved. Nonetheless, a strict requirement of a
habitual offender statute is illogical.
125 See Spence v. Superintendent, Great Meadows Corr. Facility, 219 F.3d 162, 171
(2d Cir. 2000) ("[T]here is no reason why the actual innocence exception should not
apply to noncapital sentencing procedures."). Note that the facts of this case make it
subject to possible limitation in the future.
126 See Haley v. Cockrell, 306 F.3d 257, 265 (2002) (holding that the actual
innocence exception applies only to non-capital cases in the context of a habitual
offender finding during the punishment phase of the trial), vacated sub nom. Dretke v.
Haley, 124 S. Ct. 1847 (2004); United States v. Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d 490, 495 (1999)
(holding that actual innocence applies in non--capital sentencing only in the context of
eligibility for application of career offender or other habitual offender guideline
provisions).
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The extension of this exception only to those cases involving
habitual offender statutes is counterintuitive, as the actual innocence
exception is meant to be a remedy only for those situations where strict
rules of procedure fail to protect the ends of justice. 27 It has been
contended that an extension of actual innocence to non-capital sentences
not requiring the involvement of a habitual offender statute would
eliminate the cause prong of the cause and prejudice test. 128 Clearly,
preventing the cause and prejudice test from being swallowed is a
legitimate purpose, as doing so helps ensure the procedural efficiency of
habeas courts.' 29 However, applying actual innocence only to those non-
capital cases involving habitual offender statutes seems to further this
purpose at the expense of reason. Why should those sentenced under
habitual offender statutes warrant more federal habeas corpus protection
than those in similar situations who were not sentenced under such a
statute?
As discussed earlier, the facts of Spence v. Superintendent,130 the
case wherein the Second Circuit extended actual innocence to non-
capital sentences even in the non-habitual offender statute context,
illustrate this well. Spence had made a plea agreement with a judge,
agreeing not to get in any more trouble.1 3 1 He was later arrested for
another robbery, one that he did not commit, and received a harsh
sentence per the terms of his plea agreement. 32 The court found that he
was actually innocent of the very factor which qualified him for the
harsher sentence, and thus held that his habeas corpus claim was not
defaulted. 
33
However, if the Second Circuit had found that the actual innocence
exception either: 1) did not apply to non-capital sentences, or 2) only
applied in the context of habitual offender statutes, Spence's habeas
claim would not have been allowed to proceed. Barring finding another
avenue of appeal, he would have had to serve out this excessive sentence.
The first consequence, while seeming harsh and unfair, is at least
consistent. However, not allowing Spence's claim to proceed because he
127 But see Cockrell, 306 F.3d at 266; Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d at 495.
121 Cockrell, 306 F.3d at 266; Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d at 494-95.
129 See Mikalajunas, 186 F.3d at 494-95 (stating that if the actual innocence
exception was available, any time a guideline is misapplied it would mean that whenever
a movant was prejudiced by the misapplication of a sentencing guideline and failed to
raise the error on direct appeal, a federal court could correct the error during a § 2255
proceeding).
130 Spence v. Superintendent, Great Meadow Corr. Facility, 219 F.3d 162 (2d Cir.
2000).
' Id. at 165.
132 Id.
131 Id. at 171.
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was not sentenced under a habitual offender statute seems completely
arbitrary.
Per the terms of his plea agreement, Spence was only eligible for the
harsh sentence if he was rearrested. 134 He was actually innocent of the
second robbery and therefore was not eligible for the sentence he
received at all. 135 By making eligibility for the sentence, regardless of the
facts relating to the statute under which the sentence is imposed, the
standard for applying the actual innocence exception in the sentencing
phase of non--capital cases, Spence and those like him will not be forced
to serve out sentences they do not deserve in the name of procedural
efficiency.
Additionally, by making eligibility for the specific sentence the
yardstick for application of the actual innocence exception, the Supreme
Court will harmonize the standards for capital and non-capital
sentencing. In Sawyer, the Court allowed actual innocence of
aggravating, but not mitigating, factors. 136 The Court explained, "the
'actual innocence' requirement must focus on those elements that render
a defendant eligible for the death penalty, and not on additional
mitigating evidence that was prevented from being introduced as a result
of constitutional error."' 13 7 In all likelihood, many, if not most, of the
cases which require actual innocence in non-capital sentences will deal
with habitual offender statutes. However, there is no valid reason to
foreclose the claim of a petitioner like Spence who, for whatever reason,
received a sentence for which he was not eligible. Doing so seems to do
little to remedy the problematic aspects of habeas claims and could
possibly work a grave injustice.
The argument has been made that by not limiting actual innocence in
non-capital sentences to those sentenced under habitual offender statutes
the cause prong of the cause and prejudice test would be swallowed. 3 '
While this is a valid concern, it seems unlikely to happen if eligibility
were adopted as the standard. Given the high standard of proof for an
actual innocence claim,139 and the very slight difference between those
serving sentences they are not eligible for and those doing so because of
habitual offender statutes, it is hard to see how limiting the use of actual
innocence to those sentenced under habitual offender statutes really
134 id.
131 Id. at 172.
136 Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 345 (1992) (rejecting petitioner's argument
that showing of actual innocence could extend beyond a showing that there were no
aggravating circumstances, or that some other conditions of eligibility had not been met;
holding instead that it could extend to the existence of additional mitigating evidence).
13 Id. at 347.
138 See supra note 136.
... Sawyer, 505 U.S. 346-48. But see Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324-25 (1995).
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protects the cause and prejudice test at all. True, this may slightly reduce
the number of actual innocence claims, but it will do so in an arbitrary
manner, as there is no substantive difference between those who are
serving under habitual offender statutes and those who are not.
By granting certiorari in Dretke, the Supreme Court finally had the
opportunity to decide the applicability of the actual innocence exception
in the context of the sentencing phase of non-capital cases. Given the
preceding evaluation of the situation, this note contends that the Court
should have made the extension, provided the petitioner's actual
innocence renders him ineligible for the sentence he received. Since the
Court chose to avoid this issue, this note further contends that the
language of Sawyer does not foreclose the federal circuit courts from
making this same extension, and even urges them to do just that when
given the opportunity.
V. CONCLUSION
Despite its potentially problematic nature, the writ of habeas corpus
occupies a very important place in American jurisprudence. The right to
challenge constitutionally impermissible imprisonment is absolutely
fundamental to our criminal justice system. The protection of this right
should be an issue of concern for all Americans, particularly the Supreme
Court.
In light of this, the Dretke Court should have extended the actual
innocence exception for procedurally defaulted, successive, or abusive
habeas corpus claims to the sentencing phase of all non-capital cases,
provided the petitioner's actual innocence renders them ineligible for the
sentence he received. However, since the Court did not make the
extension, it is contended that those courts who encounter this issue in
the future should find the exception applicable in this context. In so
doing, these courts will merely be making a logical extension to an
existing exception. Given the importance of this extension to the
guarantee of justice in the American legal system, no adequately
convincing argument exists not to make such an extension.
The actual innocence exception is a very limited tool to be used only
in rare instances. There is no reason to believe that this will change given
an extension to non-capital sentences, particularly in light of the fact that
several federal circuits have already made this extension, at least to some
degree. What will change, however, is the fate of those wrongfully
sentenced, who otherwise would have no recourse. The impact of the
actual innocence exception on the American legal system is, in the grand
scheme of things, quite small. Most Americans have likely never heard
of it. The same can probably be said for many, if not most, of those
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engaged in the practice and study of law. To the individual petitioner
whose liberty is spared by it, however, actual innocence is of incredible
importance. There is no doubt that the Supreme Court will again be
called upon to decide this issue. In light of the foregoing discussion, it is
clear that the Court should extend the actual innocence exception to the
sentencing phase of non-capital cases, provided the petitioner's actual
innocence renders him ineligible for the sentence he received. For the
sake of those petitioners serving wrongfully enhanced sentences in
circuits refusing to make the extension, it is hoped that this issue will
again reach the Supreme Court sooner rather than later.
